A recent UK Court of Appeal decision casts valuable light on the critical importance of promptness in filing applications to set aside default judgments, an issue directly relevant to Cypriot practitioners navigating the newly adopted CPR 2023.
Introduction
The recent UK Court of Appeal judgment in Leadingway Consultants Ltd v Saab [2025] EWCA Civ 582 provides timely and authoritative guidance on a key procedural issue: the importance of promptness in applications to set aside default judgments.
For Cypriot legal practitioners, this decision comes at a pivotal moment. With the Cyprus Civil Procedure Rules 2023 (CPR 2023) now in force since September 2023, case law interpreting Part 14 (which governs such applications) remains in its early stages. Given the identical wording of the relevant provisions in both the Cyprus and English CPR, English appellate decisions, particularly one as clear and instructive as Leadingwa, offer persuasive and practical guidance for Cypriot courts and practitioners alike.
Although the judgment also touches on other legal principles, this article focuses solely on the Court of Appeal’s treatment of applications to set aside default judgments, with particular emphasis on the requirement for promptness.
The Facts in Brief
The case of Leadingway Consultants Ltd v Saab [2025] EWCA Civ 582 arose out of a high-value commercial dispute. The Claimant had loaned approximately €35 million to a Bermuda-based financial company, which was ultimately controlled by the two Defendants. After the company went into liquidation, both individuals allegedly agreed to personally ensure the debt would be repaid.
The Claimant issued proceedings in England and personally served D1 in Cyprus in March 2022. However, D1 failed to engage with the proceedings until 16 months later, when he applied to set aside the judgment in December 2023.
His application was heard concurrently with an application by D2, who was still actively involved in the proceedings and disputing jurisdiction. D1’s primary argument was that proceedings were still ongoing against D2, and therefore, the litigation as a whole was not concluded. He sought to rely on a line of reasoning drawn from Hussain v Birmingham City Council [2005] EWCA Civ 1570, in which the court observed that the existence of identical issues to be tried against a co-defendant might, in certain cases, be a relevant consideration when exercising discretion to set aside a default judgment. Relying on this reasoning, D1 advanced what he referred to as the “co-defendant principle”—namely, the proposition that ongoing proceedings against another party could justify, or at least mitigate, delay in seeking relief from judgment.
D1 also pointed to practical difficulties in obtaining legal representation, particularly due to financial constraints and family obligations. He contended that these circumstances justified the delay and supported the setting aside of the default judgment to allow the case to proceed on its merits.
Judgment
The High Court accepted that D1 had a real prospect of successfully defending the claim and, despite acknowledging the significant and unexplained delay, exercised its discretion to set aside the judgment. A key factor in the court’s reasoning was that the case was still active against D2, and thus there was “no real sense” that the dispute had concluded.
However, the Court of Appeal decisively overturned that decision and reinstated the default judgment. It emphasised that promptness under CPR 13.3(2) is not merely one discretionary factor among many, but a mandatory and independent requirement. The Court of Appeal found that D1 had failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the 16-month delay and made clear that the existence of ongoing proceedings against a co-defendant does not excuse such delay or lessen the obligation to act promptly.
Importantly, the Court of Appeal expressly rejected the existence of any so-called “co-defendant principle,” as loosely inferred from cases like Hussain above. It clarified that the involvement of other defendants in parallel proceedings does not diminish the significance of delay or excuse procedural inaction. The Court of Appeal reaffirmed that finality, procedural discipline, and efficiency are foundational principles of the modern civil justice system.
Key Lessons to be Learned
Under the previous Cypriot Civil Procedure Rules (o. 17, r. 10), the courts often adopted a more lenient approach when considering applications to set aside default judgments, particularly where the defendant appeared to have a substantive defence. However, the introduction of CPR 2023 marks a clear shift in procedural culture: towards stricter adherence to timelines and a heightened focus on the overriding objective of efficient, fair, and proportionate litigation.
Both the English CPR 13.3 and CPR 2023 Part 14.3 provide that the court may set aside a default judgment if:
(a) the defendant has a real prospect of successfully defending the claim; or
(b) it appears to the court that there is some other good reason why –
(i) the judgment should be set aside or varied; or
(ii) the defendant should be allowed to defend the claim.
Crucially, both frameworks explicitly state that in considering whether to set aside or vary a default judgment, the court must have regard to whether the application was made promptly.
In Leadingway, the Court of Appeal made it unequivocally clear that even if a defendant has a strong arguable defence, a substantial and unexplained delay will weigh heavily against granting relief. The 16-month lapse in that case was found to undermine the core principles of fairness, procedural efficiency, and finality, which are cornerstones of both the English and Cypriot civil justice systems.
While the court’s discretion to set aside default judgments remains intact, Leadingway confirms that such discretion is not unfettered. A failure to act promptly, especially where unexplained, may alone be fatal to an application, regardless of the underlying merits of the defence.
What can we take away from Leadingway?
Promptness is non-negotiable. – Applications must be made promptly—as soon as a party becomes aware of the judgment. Delays of several months, let alone over a year, are exceedingly difficult to justify.
There is no “co-defendant principle” – The fact that similar issues remain live against another party does not excuse delay. Each defendant must act independently and within the prescribed procedural framework.
Merits of the defence are not enough. Even where a defence is substantial, it cannot override a prolonged and unexplained failure to act. Delay is a separate and decisive factor.
Conclusion
Leadingway undoubtedly offers timely and practical guidance as Cypriot courts begin interpreting and applying the reformed CPR 2023. It underscores the centrality of promptness, reaffirms the finality of default judgments, and firmly rejects misplaced reliance on co-defendant proceedings as a justification for delay.
The message is clear: substantive merit alone will not rescue an application filed too late. For Cypriot practitioners – the new CPR 2023 demands greater procedural discipline, and Leadingway is a firm reminder that civil justice must move forward without unnecessary delay. Under CPR 2023, Cypriot practitioners must embrace a new procedural culture—one that prioritises discipline, efficiency, and timely action. Leadingway serves as a compelling reminder that civil justice must advance without avoidable delay.
Disclaimer:
This article is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Readers should seek specific legal counsel based on the circumstances of their case.
